Can simple government programs effectively promote voluntary initiatives to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions? This paper provides an evaluation of how the Connecticut Clean Energy Communities program affects household decisions to voluntarily purchase "green" electricity, which is electricity generated from renewable sources of energy. The results suggest that, within participating communities, subsidizing municipal solar panels as matching grants for reaching green-electricity enrollment targets increases the number of household purchases by 35 percent. The Clean Energy Communities program thus demonstrates how mostly symbolic incentives can mobilize voluntary initiatives within communities and promote demand for renewable energy.
Introduction
Concern about climate change is having an increasing influence on how companies pursue corporate strategy and individuals make consumption choices. There exists a large and growing literature that seeks to explain why such voluntary initiatives occur and to evaluate their effectiveness. General areas of inquiry include corporate environmental management (e.g., Lyon and Maxwell 2004) , voluntary programs (e.g., Morgenstern and Pizer 2007; Potoski and Prakash 2009) , and environmentally friendly consumption (e.g., Kotchen 2005 Kotchen , 2006 . Despite great enthusiasm for voluntary initiatives, economic theory casts serious doubt on whether they alone can meaningfully address the challenges of climate change. The incentive for free-riding is simply too strong when it comes to the voluntary provision of public goods-especially ones that are global in scale.
It would be a mistake, however, to ignore voluntary initiatives entirely in the pursuit of climate policy based on more centralized instruments. When individual nations, states, and municipalities seek to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, they are volunteering to incur their own costs in the interest of global, public benefits. But even outside of regulatory frameworks, voluntary initiatives warrant attention. Real and substantial expenditures are being made in the interest of climate-related corporate strategy, voluntary programs, and "green" goods and services. We should thus seek to maximize the potential benefit of these activities. What is more, and perhaps less recognized, is that voluntary initiatives are effective at increasing awareness, education, and opportunities for leadership. Apart from their potential to reduce emissions, voluntary initiatives are important because of their influence on public support for climate policy more generally. This paper considers a question that has received little attention in the literature: Can simple and relatively low-cost government programs effectively promote voluntary initiatives?
In particular, what follows is an evaluation of how the Connecticut Clean Energy Communities (CCEC) program affects whether households voluntarily switch to an electricity provider with generation capacity that comes entirely from renewable sources of energy. The results suggest that within participating communities, offering symbolic rewards-i.e., municipal solar panels or some other clean-energy technology-upon reaching green-electricity enrollment targets increases the number of household purchases by 35 percent. In effect, the CCEC program is responsible for 7,020 additional households having purchased green electricity. The reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions due to these additional purchases comes from a modest and mostly symbolic subsidy. The CCEC program can thus serve as model for how basic incentive programs can mobilize voluntary initiatives within communities, promote demand for renewable energy, and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. While a growing body of research investigates how "green nudges" can change individual behavior as it relates to the environment, the present paper evaluates effectiveness of a green nudge applied at the community level.
Background
The 1 The Options Program is also available to commercial customers, but this paper restricts attention to residential households. See CTFund (2010) for complete details. 2 Qualification also depends on a few other criteria, including municipal government purchases of clean energy and participation in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Community Energy Challenge. In practice, however, the other criteria are generally not binding constraints and have also changed somewhat through time. While the program description here is simplified to focus on factors influencing residential participation, interested readers should refer to CTFund (2010) for complete details about qualification criteria and point conversions. 
Analysis
Existing studies use household surveys to investigate variables that explain the decision to participate in price-premium, green-electricity programs (e.g., Clark et al. 2003; Kotchen and Moore 2007) . The closest thing possible with the Connecticut data is to use municipality characteristics to explain differences in municipality Options Program participation rates. Table   2 reports the results of two regression models in which the dependent variable is the natural log of a municipality's Options Program participation rate in December 2009. Model (a) includes number of households, income, and education as explanatory variables. Municipalities that are larger have lower participation rates, more highly educated municipalities have higher participation rates, and municipalities with greater income have lower participation rates. Onethousand additional households in a municipality is associated with a 3-percent decrease in the participation rate. A 10-percent increase in the proportion of residents with at least a college degree is associated with a 6-percent increase in the participation rate. Finally, after controlling for education, a $1,000 increase in median income is associated with a 1.6-percent decrease in the participation rate.
Model (b) includes two additional dummy variables for whether in December 2009 the municipality is enrolled in the CCEC program or the 20by2010 campaign. These variables are included in the model because they are expected to affect participation rates, meaning that excluding them renders the model susceptible to omitted variable bias. Hence the important thing to note is that the coefficients on number of households, income, and education do not change substantially. While one might be tempted to interpret the new coefficients as estimates of the program effects on household participation rates, this should be done with caution for at least two reasons. First, the variables account for enrollments in December 2009, but municipalities up until that point had been enrolled for different periods of time, as can be seen in Figure 2 .
Second, the CCEC variable is susceptible to some degree of endogeneity because threshold participation rates must be met before a municipality is able to qualify. Despite these caveats, the estimates imply that compared to municipalities enrolled in neither program, those in only 20by2010 have 40 percent higher participation rates on average; and those in CCEC have participation rates that are 90 percent higher, where 50 percent of the difference is due to CCEC enrollment over and above the effect of 20by2010. Turning now to an alternative empirical strategy, these differences are shown to be overestimates of the actual program effects. 
where i indexes municipalities, t indexes each month-year, μ i is a unique intercept for each municipality, ν t is a unique intercept for each month-year, and ε it is an error term. Advantages of specification (1) are that it controls for changes in participation rates through time that are common to all municipalities and for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity among municipalities (e.g., differences in size, education, and income). campaign.
Model (a) in Table 3 reports the fixed effects estimates of equation (1) A potential concern with the preceding estimate of the CCEC effect on participation rates is still endogeneity due to the participation threshold for enrollment. Municipalities with more participants in the Options Program are more likely to qualify for CCEC enrollment, and this relationship could lead to an overestimate of β. To address this concern, a useful feature of the data is that qualifying municipalities do not always enroll in the CCEC program. In fact, enrollment occurs in only 62 percent of the periods when municipalities satisfy the qualification threshold. As an alternate specification, model (b) in Table 3 includes an additional dummy variable to control for the average difference in participation rates due to satisfying the qualification threshold, which is distinct from CCEC enrollment. While the coefficients of interest do not change substantially, they do have lower magnitudes. The 20by2010 effect remains statistically indistinguishable from zero, and the additional CCEC effect reduces to 35 percent. Combining the two coefficients in this model, the overall difference in participation rates associated with CCEC enrollment, compared to no program enrollment, is 37 percent.
Conclusion
Can symbolic rewards in the form of publically displayed solar panels in municipalities increase 
